Читаю статью на тему: http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm
8. As a primary communications center, Dresden was the junction of three great trunk routes in the German railway system: (1) Berlin-Prague-Vienna, (2) Munich-Breslau, and (3) Hamburg-Leipzig. As a key center in the dense Berlin-Leipzig railway complex, Dresden was connected to both cities by two main lines.6 The density, volume, and importance of the Dresden-Saxony railway system within the German geography and e economy is seen in the facts that in 1939 Saxony was seventh in area among the major German states, ranked seventh in its railway mileage, but ranked third in the total tonnage carried by rail.7
The Russian Request for Allied Bombing of Communications in the Dresden Area:
17. The Allied-Russian interchanges that had begun in the closing months of 1944 and had become, with the passing of time, more frequent and more specific, culminated in the ARGONAUT Conferences of January-February 1945. On 4 February, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, together with their foreign secretaries and military advisors, assembled at Yalta to present definitive and specific plans, and requests, for bringing the war against Germany to a victorious conclusion, by the summer of 1945, if possible (Other considerations involved in the ARGONAUT deliberations are not pertinent or relevant here). At this meeting, Marshal Stalin asked Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, to outline to the Conference the situation existing on the Eastern Front and to describe Russia’s plans for subsequent operations. At the conclusion of his extended presentation, General Antonov made three specific requests for Allied assistance to the Russians27
Our wishes are:
a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable: (1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front. (2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes. (3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East (It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February).
b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy (In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig).
c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.
18. It was the specific Russian request for bombing communications, coupled with the emphasis on forcing troops to shift from west to east through communications centers, that led to the Allied bombings of Dresden. The structure of the Berlin-Leipzig-Dresden railway complex, as outlined in paragraph 8 above, required that Dresden, as well as Berlin and Leipzig, be bombed. Therefore Allied air authorities concluded that the bombing of Dresden would have to be undertaken (1) in order to implement strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, and now agreed upon at the highest levels of governmental authority, and (2) to respond to the specific Russian request presented to the Allies by General Antonov to “paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.”
(27) ARGONAUT Conference Minutes of the Plenary Meeting between the U.S.A., Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R., held in Livadia Palace, Yalta, on Sunday, 4 February 1945, at 1700. Supporting Document No. 12.
Мой близкий по смыслу перевод пункта 18:
18. Просьба советских военных подвергнуть бомбардировке [немецкие] коммуникации, вкупе с упором на вынуждение [немецких] войск перемещаться с запада на восток через центры коммуникаций привели к бомбардировке Дрездена союзниками. Структура железнодорожного комплекса Берлин-Лейпциг-Дрезден (описана в параграфе 8), требовала бомбардировки всех трех городов: Дрездена, Берлина и Лейпцига. В силу этого начальство ВВС Союзников пришли к выводу что бомбардировка Дрездена необходима: 1) В целях реализации стратегических задач, согласованых на высочайшем уровне государственной власти, и представляющих взаимный интерес для Союзников и СССР, и 2) В ответ на конкретный запрос советской стороны (а именно — генерала Антонова) "парализовать железнодорожные узлы Берлина и Лейпцига"
В первый раз о таком слышу. В русских источниках упоминания этого — есть? И вообще побольше информации бы. Ссылка на документ откуда это взяли в тексте имеется (ссылка 27 — стенография ялтинской конференции, 4/02/1945 в 17:00), но в инете я его не нашел...