Антитопик, наткнулся. Про комп Аполло. Переводить не буду; кто ниасилит, тот проходит-не-толпится.
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Нынешние песатели рыдали бы от таких условий, а тогдашние инженеры — от нынешнего мягкосмического креатива.
"There was never enough memory (32K of program space) ... Consider that a tiny 32K program controlled the attitude indicator, all thrusting and guidance, a user interface, and much more."
"Aldrin wanted to leave the rendezvous radar (which was only needed to seek out the command module) turned on in case an emergency abort was needed. Program management signed off on this change (!!! эти товарищи не меняются !!!), but no one told the software engineers. Data from the radar demanded computer attention that was in short supply, so it flashed the 1201 and 1202 codes indicating "I'm getting overwhelmed!" The AGC rejected low-priority tasks but ran the landing activities correctly. That's pretty slick software engineering."
"Flash memory hadn't been invented. Nor had EPROM, EEPROM, or any of the other parts we use to store code. For reasons not described in the book (primarily size), traditional core memory wasn't an option, so the AGC stored its programs in core rope. Programs were "manufactured"--the team had to submit completed tapes three months before launch so
women could weave the programs into the core ropes that were then potted. Once built, it was extremely difficult to change even a single bit."
A new book describes the creation of the Apollo Guidance Computer in the detail only an engineer can love...and engineers WILL love it.
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